X-Git-Url: http://xvm.mit.edu/gitweb/invirt/packages/invirt-dev.git/blobdiff_plain/ab69fa47de5126ea8147c31fd98d995672661131..fc9beda05f67ce8e101598ae8a7a3500e3e836e9:/README.invirtibuilder?ds=sidebyside diff --git a/README.invirtibuilder b/README.invirtibuilder index d364399..a60c2e9 100644 --- a/README.invirtibuilder +++ b/README.invirtibuilder @@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ design of the Invirtibuilder: Because of how Git tracks history, it's better suited for tracking a series of small repositories, as opposed to one large one - [#]_. Furthermore, most pre-existing tools and techniques for - dealing with Debian packages in Git repositories (such as - git-buildpackage_ or `VCS location information`_) are designed - exclusively for this case. + [#]_. Furthermore, most preexisting tools and techniques for dealing + with Debian packages in Git repositories (such as git-buildpackage_ + or `VCS location information`_) are designed exclusively for this + case. * Synchronization between Git and APT repositories. @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Configuration For the Invirt_ project's use of the Invirtibuilder, we adapted our existing configuration mechanism. Our configuration file consists of a -singls YAML_ file. Here is the snippet of configuration we use for our +single YAML_ file. Here is the snippet of configuration we use for our build configuration:: build: @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ We considered several ways to trigger builds of new package versions using Git directly. However, we realized that what we actually wanted was a separate build queue where each build request was handled and processed independently of any requests before or after it. It's not -possible to have these semantics using Git as a signalling mechanism +possible to have these semantics using Git as a signaling mechanism without breaking standard assumptions about how remote Git repositories work. @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ server with a pocket, a package, and a commit ID from that package's Git repository. The remctl daemon then calls a script which validates the build and adds it to the build queue. Because of the structure of remctl's ACLs, we are able to have different ACLs depending on which -pocket the build is destined for. This allows us to fulfil our design +pocket the build is destined for. This allows us to fulfill our design goal of having different ACLs for different pockets. For simplicity, the queue itself is maintained as a directory of @@ -289,9 +289,97 @@ build daemon runs any scripts in a hook directory. The hook directory could contain scripts to publish the results of the build in whatever way is deemed useful by the developers. +Security +======== + +As noted above, our intent was for a single instance of the +Invirtibuilder to be used for both our trusted production environment +and our untrusted development environment. In order to be trusted for +the production environment, the Invirtibuilder needs to run in the +production environment as well. However, it would be disastrous if +access to the development environment allowed a developer to insert +malicious packages into the production apt repository. + +In terms of policy, we enforce this distinction using the remctl ACL +mechanism described in `The Build Queue`_. But is that mechanism on +its own actually secure? + +Only mostly, it turns out. + +While actual package builds run unprivileged (with the help of the +fakeroot_ tool), packages can declare arbitrary build dependencies +that must be installed for the package build to run. Packages' +maintainer scripts (post-install, pre-install, pre-removal, and +post-removal scripts) run as root. This means that by uploading a +malicious package that another package build-depends on, then +triggering a build of the second package, it is possible to gain root +privileges. Since breaking out of the build chroot as root is trivial +[#], it is theoretically possible for developers with any level of +access to the APT repositories to root the build server. + +One minor protection from this problem is the Invirtibuilder's +reporting mechanism. A single independent malicious build can't +compromise the build server on its own. Even if a second build +compromises the build server, the first build will have already been +reported through the hook mechanism described in `Build Failures`_. We +encourage users of the Invirtibuilder to include hooks that send +notifications of builds over e-mail or some other mechanism such that +there are off-site records. The server will still be compromised, but +there will be an audit trail. + +Such a vulnerability will always be a concern so long as builds are +isolated using chroots. It is possible to protect against this sort of +attack by strengthening the chroot mechanism (e.g. with grsecurity_) +or by using a more isolated build mechanism +(e.g. qemubuilder_). However, we decided that the security risk didn't +justify the additional implementation effort or runtime overhead. + +Future Directions +================= + +While the Invirtibuilder was written as a tool for the Invirt_ +project, taking advantage of infrastructure specific to Invirt, it was +designed with the hope that it could one day be expanded to be useful +outside of our infrastructure. Here we outline what we believe the +next steps for development of the Invirtibuilder are. + +One deficiency that affects Invirt_ development already is the +assumption that all packages are Debian-native [#]. Even for packages +which have a non-native version number, the Invirtibuilder will create +a Debian-native source package when the package is exported from Git +as part of the `Build Execution`_. Correcting this requires a means to +find and extract the upstream tarball from the Git repository. This +could probably be done by involving the pristine-tar_ tool. + +The Invirtibuilder is currently tied to the configuration framework +developed for the Invirt_ project. To be useful outside of Invirt, the +Invirtibuilder needs its own, separate mechanism for providing and +parsing configuration. It should not be difficult to use a separate +configuration file but a similar YAML configuration mechanism for the +Invirtibuilder. And of course, as part of that process, filesystem +paths and the like that are currently hard-coded should be replaced +with configuration options. + +The Invirtibuilder additionally relies on the authentication and +authorization mechanisms used for Invirt_. Our RPC protocol of choice, +remctl_, requires a functional Kerberos environment for +authentication, limiting its usefulness for one-off projects not +associated with an already existing Kerberos realm. We would like to +provide support for some alternative RPC mechanism—possibly +ssh. Additionally, there needs to be some way to expand the build ACLs +for each pocket that isn't tied to Invirt's authorization +framework. One option would be providing an executable in the +configuration that, when passed a pocket as a command-line argument, +prints out all of the principals that should have access to that +pocket. + .. _config-package-dev: http://debathena.mit.edu/config-packages +.. _fakeroot: http://fakeroot.alioth.debian.org/ .. _git-buildpackage: https://honk.sigxcpu.org/piki/projects/git-buildpackage/ +.. _grsecurity: http://www.grsecurity.net/ .. _Invirt: http://invirt.mit.edu +.. _pristine-tar: http://joey.kitenet.net/code/pristine-tar/ +.. _qemubuilder: http://wiki.debian.org/qemubuilder .. _remctl: http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/software/remctl/ .. _SIPB: http://sipb.mit.edu .. _VCS location information: http://www.debian.org/doc/developers-reference/best-pkging-practices.html#bpp-vcs @@ -305,3 +393,5 @@ way is deemed useful by the developers. pockets with ``allow_backtracking`` set to ``True``, we don't create new tags for builds on pockets with ``allow_backtracking`` set to ``True`` either. +.. [#] http://kerneltrap.org/Linux/Abusing_chroot +.. [#] http://people.debian.org/~mpalmer/debian-mentors_FAQ.html#native_vs_non_native